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Revisiting the proof theory of Classical S4 
Revisitando a teoria da prova de S4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In 1965 Dag Prawitz presented an extension of Gentzen-type systems of Natural 
Deduction to modal concepts of S4. Maria da Paz Medeiros showed in 2006 that 
the proof of normalisation for classical S4 does not hold and proposed a new 
proof of normalisation for a logically equivalent system, the system NS4. 
However two problems in the proof of the critical lemma used by Medeiros in 
her proof were pointed out by Yuuki Andou in 2009. This paper presents a proof 
of the critical lemma, resulting in a proof of normalisation for NS4.  
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Resumo 
Em 1965, Dag Prawitz apresentou uma extensão dos sistemas tipo-Gentzen de 
Dedução Natural para os conceitos modais de S4. Maria da Paz Medeiros 
mostrou em 2006 que a prova de normalização para o S4 clássico não estava 
correta e propôs uma nova prova de normalização para um sistema logicamente 
equivalente, o sistema NS4. No entanto, dois problemas na prova do lema 
crítico usado por Medeiros em sua prova foram apontados por Yuuki Andou em 
2009. Este artigo apresenta uma nova prova do lema crítico e, 
consequentemente, uma prova de normalização para NS4. 
 
Palavras-chave: lógica modal; teoria da prova; normalização. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In his Ph.D. thesis, Dag Prawitz (2006) extended the Gentzen-type systems of 
Natural Deduction (ND) to modal concepts, obtaining Gentzen-type systems of 
ND for S4 based on classical, intuitionistic and minimal predicate logic. For this 
purpose, a modal operator of necessity (here represented by □) was added 
together with the rules for its introduction and elimination. Prawitz then 
presented three formalizations of those modal systems, which differed in the 
restrictions on the introduction rule for □, and stated that only the third one 
would accept the Normalisation Theorem. 
About forty years later, Maria da Paz Medeiros (2006) argued that 
Prawitz’s normalisation procedure does not hold on the third version of the ND 
system for classical S4, and proposed a new system for S4, the system NS4, for 
which the Normalisation Theorem would hold. 
However, recently Yuuki Andou (2009a) pointed out two problems in 
the proof of a lemma (namely the critical lemma) that plays a crucial role in 
Medeiros’ proof of the Normalisation Theorem. Andou (2009a) presented a 
Normal Form Theorem, showing that for any proof Π there is a proof Π' in 
normal form by means of cut-elimination, but do not present a normalisation 
procedure. 
In this paper we present a correction of Medeiros’ proof of the 
aforementioned lemma and fulfil a normalisation procedure for NS4, which 
gives a computational interpretation of proofs by means of the Curry-Howard 
Correspondence. Despite the fact that the existence of a normalised version of 
any proof of S4 is already proved, to the best of our knowledge this is the first 
proof of normalisation for which a normalisation procedure is presented for a 
Natural Deduction system for S4. 
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After some definitions used in the present work (Section2), we outline 
the original third version of Prawitz’s system for classical S4 and the 
counterexamples by Medeiros (Section3). We then discuss the two cases in 
which the system may not produce valid derivations on NS4 due to problems in 
the proof of the critical lemma (Section 4). In Section 5 we present a proof of the 
critical lemma for NS4. Our concern here is with Classical Propositional S4, but 
an extension of Classical First Order S4 could be easily obtained by adding the 
corresponding rules for quantifiers. 
 
 
2. Definitions 
  
Based in the work of Maria da Paz Medeiros (2006), we present the definitions 
used in this work. 
 
Definition 1 
The premisses (A→B) of the rule (E),(A∧B) of, (E˄),(A∨B) of (E),(□A) of 
(E□), and the premisses □B 1,…,□Bn of (I□) are called major premisses and the 
others minor premisses.  
 
Definition 2 
A segment in a derivation is a sequence A1,…,An of occurrences of the same 
formula in a branch such that A1 is not the conclusion of an application of 
(E)nor a discharged assumption through an application of (I□), and An is not a 
minor premiss of (E) nor a major premiss of (I□).  
 
Definition 3 
The length of a segment is the number of formula occurrences in this segment.  
 
Definition 4 
A maximal segment in a derivation is a segment A1,…,Ansuch that A1 is the 
conclusion of an application of an introduction rule or (⊥c), and An is a major 
premiss of an application of an elimination rule. 
  
Definition 5 
A maximal formula is a maximal segment whose length is 1(one). A premiss is 
called a maximal premiss if it belongs to some maximal segment. 
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Definition 6 
A formula A is a trivial formula if A is the conclusion of an application of (⊥c) 
and the minor premiss of an application of(E) whose major premiss is the 
assumption ¬A. 
  
Definition 7 
The degree of a formula A, G(A), is the number of occurrences in A of logical 
symbols different from ⊥ . The degree of a segment is the degree of the formula 
that belongs to this segment. 
  
Definition 8 
The degree of a derivationΠ, G(Π) is the highest degree of a maximal segment 
of Π. If Π does not have maximal segments, then G(Π)=0. 
  
Definition 9 
A critical derivation is a derivation Π such that, if G(Π)=d, then the last 
inference of Π has a maximal premiss with degree d, and for every subderivation 
Σ of Π, G(Σ)<G(Π). 
 
Definition 10 
The index of a derivation Π is I(Π)=d, s, where s is the sum of the lengths of 
the maximal segments of Π whose degree is d. If Π does not have maximal 
segments, then I(Π)= 0, 0. 
 
Definition 11 
A derivation Π is a normal derivation if  Π does not have maximal segments. 
  
Definition 12 
A formula A is essentially modal when each occurrence of a predicate parameter 
or predicate constant in A stands within the scope of an occurrence of □. 
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3.  A counterexample for Prawitz’s classical S4 system 
 
According to the restriction on the □-I rule in Prawitz’s third version of S4, if a 
formula A depends on an assumption B and there exists an essentially modal 
formula F on the thread of A from B such that A depends on every assumption 
which F depends on, then □-I could be applied at A. 
But Maria da Paz Medeiros (2006) argued that such restriction would 
not avoid maximal formulas by pointing out that although the following 
derivation: 
 
is valid in S4, its reduction is not:  
 
It was presented a new Natural Deduction for S4 system, called system NS4 and 
proposed a normalisation proof by critical lemma Medeiros (2006). This new 
system is composed of the logical symbols ∧ ,∨ ,→,⊥  and □ and the usual rules, 
except for □-I, which is as follows:  
 
(We use for a sequence of deductions of the form  where 
no two □Bi’s are equal. We also write[□ ]k to indicate that each □Bi is 
discharged at k. Labels may be dropped.) 
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This restriction on □-I rule states that all the assumptions in [□ ]k must be 
discharged by the application of □-I and the premiss A must not depend on any 
assumption other than the ones in □ . The reason for this is explained in item 4 
of the proof of the critical lemma and it does not affect the completeness of the 
system. 
Together with this new □-I rule, we have the following reduction:  
 
(1) 
and the permutative reduction bellow:  
 
(2) 
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4.  A problem in the normalisation proof of NS4 
 
Medeiros’ normalisation proof begins with the assumption that a derivation Π of 
C from Γ can be transformed in a derivation Π0. The aim is to show that I(Π0) 
<I(Π). Next, it uses a critical lemma according to which, if Π is a critical 
derivation of C from Γ, then Π can be transformed into a derivation Π' such that 
I(Π')<I(Π). By the critical lemma, a subderivation Σ of Π can be transformed in a 
subderivation Σ' such that I(Σ')<I(Σ); but, then, Π1 is the derivation resulted 
from the substitution of Σ' for Σ in Π0, and I(Π1) <I(Π0).  
However, recently Yuuki Andou (2009b) pointed out two flaws in the 
proof of Medeiros’ critical lemma. The first one concerns critical derivations of 
the form  
 
(3) 
where the major premiss F is the conclusion of⊥c and r is an elimination rule. 
According to Medeiros, this derivation can be transformed into  
 
(4) 
depending on C being ⊥  or not. 
Note that the assumptions of the form ¬F discharged at the rule i may occur 
more than once in Π, and that the premiss F which is conclusion of Σ0,1 may be 
a maximal premiss in Π' and in Π''. In this case the index of either Π' or Π'' may 
be even greater than that of Π. Besides, one of the Hi’s in ⃗ H, say Hl, may be a 
maximal formula of degree G(F) and, in this case, even if the F side connected 
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with ¬F is not a maximal formula in Π', this Hl still is and the induction 
hypothesis cannot be used. 
The second problem pointed out is when Π has degree G(□A) and is a critical 
derivation of the form: 
 
(5) 
 
If □A occurs more than once as top-formula of 2, by reducing Π to  
 
the number of occurrences of □A as maximal formula in Π' will be greater than 
in Π. 
Thus, it is possible that the reduction process generates copies of maximal 
formulas, so the index of Π' may be greater than that of Π. 
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5.  Yet another proof of the critical lemma 
 
We present a proof of the critical lemma for the fragment {∧ ,→,⊥ ,□}. 
Extensions to First Order Logic are easily obtained. 
Lemma 1. A critical derivation of the form where F is 
the conclusion of ⊥c, can be transformed in a derivation
 
 
WhereΠ1 is a derivation without trivial formulas. Thus, the end-formula of Σ′1,1 
is not conclusion of ⊥c.  
Proof. See the work of Medeiros (2006).  
Note that Π1 has no more maximal formulas of degree equal to or higher than 
G(F) than Π. We will use the symbol to indicate the transformation of a 
derivation into a derivation without trivial formulas. 
Theorem 5.1 If Π is a critical derivation of C from Γ, then Π can be 
transformed into a derivation Π' such that G(Π')<G(Π).  
Suppose Π is a critical derivation with maximal premisses of degree G(Π) which 
are premisses of the last inference of Π, #G(Π) is the number of maximal 
formulas of Π with degree G(Π) and l(Π) is the lenght of Π. The proof is by 
induction on the pair #G(Π), l(Π).  
 
It is easy to see that G(Π′) <G(Π).  
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It is easy to see that G(Π′) <G(Π).  
 
 
If there exists a □Bl which is a maximal premiss at Π′, then it would be a 
maximal formula at Π and, as Π is a critical derivation, G(□Bl) <G(□C). Thus, 
G(Π′) <G(Π).  
 
We have two cases to consider:  
(a) there is an occurrence of □A which is top-formula of 2 and major premiss 
of an application of □-E: in this case, the number of maximal formulas of degree 
G(□A) in Π1 may be even greater than that of Π, as there may be more than one 
occurrence of □A as top-formula of 2.  
There is a critical subderivation Ξ1 of Π1 of the form which can 
be reduced to (case 3) 
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(b) there is an occurrence of □A which is top-formula of 2 and major premiss 
of □-I : then, there is a critical subderivation Ξ2 of the form  
 
 
The lenght of Ξ2 is smaller than the lenght of Π. Hence, by the 
induction hypothesis, we can reduce Ξ2 to a Ξ′2 such that G(Ξ′2) <G(Π). 
Note that we cannot guarantee that the lenght of Ξ2 is smaller than the 
lenght of Π if there were more than one occurrence of □A as top-formula of 2 
in Π1, and if there were many occurrences of □A as major premiss in Ξ2. That is 
the reason of the restriction on the beginning of the section.  
Let Π2 be the result of replacing each occurrence of critical 
subderivations of the form of Ξ1 and the form of Ξ2 in Π1 by Ξ′1 and Ξ′2 
respectively.  
If □A is the only major premiss that is maximal formula in Π, i.e., there is no 
member of which is a maximal premiss of the same degree of Π, then G(Π2) 
<G(Π) and Π2 = Π. Otherwise, i.e., if there exists a m such that Hm is a 
maximal formula in Π, then #G(Π2) < #G(Π) and, as Π2 is a critical derivation, 
by the induction hypothesis Π2 can be transformed into a derivation Π′ such 
thatG(Π′) <G(Π2). Hence, as Π was transformed into Π2 and G(Π2) is not 
higher than G(Π), G(Π′) <G(Π).  
 
If the end formula of Σ′1,1 is not the conclusion of an introduction rule, then the 
end-formula of Σ′1,1 is not a maximal formula and G(Π1) <G(Π) and Π1 ≡ Π′. If 
the end formula of Σ′1,1 is the conclusion of an introduction rule, then Π1 is of 
the form  
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which can be reduced to and G(Π′) < 
G(Π). 
 
 
If the end formula of Σ′1,1 is not the conclusion of an introduction rule, then 
G(Π1) <G(Π) and Π1 ≡ Π′. If the end formula of Σ′1,1 is the conclusion of an 
introduction rule, then Π1 is of the form: 
which can be reduced to  
and G(Π′) < G(Π).  
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If the end formula of Σ′1,1 is not the conclusion of an introduction rule, 
then G(Π1) <G(Π) and Π1 ≡ Π′. If the end formula of Σ′1,1 is the conclusion of 
an introduction rule, then Π1 is of the form: 
which can be reduced to  
 
If one of the Bi’s, say Bm, were a maximal formula in Π2, it would be a 
maximal formula in Π and, as Π is a critical derivation, G(Bm) <G(A). Thus, 
G(Π2) <G(Π) and Π2 ≡ Π′.  
 
Note that Σ′1,1 is a subderivation of Σ1. Hence, if the subderivation 
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of Π1 is a critical derivation, its lenght is 
smaller than the lenght of Π. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, Λ can be 
reduced to a derivation Λ′ such that G(Λ′) <G(Π). The result of replacing each 
occurrence of Λ in Π1 by Λ′ is a derivation Π′ such that G(Π′) <G(Π).  
 
 
The critical subderivation   of Π1 is smaller than Π. Thus, 
by the induction hypothesis, Λ can be reduced to a derivation Λ′ such that G(Λ′) 
<G(Π). By replacing each occurrence of Λ in Π1 by Λ′ we achieve the desired 
derivation. This case deals with classical ⊥with the elimination of implication, 
conjunction and box.  
 
If ¬F → C were a maximal formula in Π′, it would be a maximal 
formula in Π, which is not the case as, by hypothesis, G(Π) = G(F) and G(F) 
<G(¬F → C). Hence, G(Π) <G(Π′). 
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6.  Conclusions 
 
This work presented the problem pointed out by Maria da Paz Medeiros (2006) 
on the normalisation procedure proposed by Dag Prawitz (2006), followed by 
the system suggested by Medeiros (2006), the NS4. She presented a 
normalisation proof for this system for which we presented the problems pointed 
out by Yuuki Andou (2009b) and finally we presented a proof of the 
Normalisation Theorem for NS4. 
Among other deductive systems for S4, there are some where the 
Normalisation Theorem holds, like Sequent Calculus. There is also a Natural 
Deduction with Labels system by Alex Simpson Simpson (1994) for which the 
Normalisation Theorem holds. But the system proposed by Dag Prawitz (2006) 
and Maria da Paz Medeiros (2006) are pure Natural Deduction systems, without 
semantic interferences (as the labels from the system of Alex Simpson) for 
which there are no previous proof of the Normalisation Theorem known into the 
available literature. Yuuki Andou showed that for any proof of S4 there is a 
normalised proof via cut-elimination Andou (2009a) but did not present a 
normalisation procedure. We fulfilled that gap by presenting a correction in 
Medeiros’ proof that lead to a normalised Natural Deduction system for S4, the 
NS4 system. 
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